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Abstract: 
Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic 
in Syria, Iran and Pakistan 
Maryam Ghadyani, Hinna Hussain, Wael Odeh, Philip Wood 
This paper1 describes the reaction to the COVID-19 outbreak on social media in Iran, Syria 
and Pakistan. In particular, we focus on issues of the place of religion in society, on 
international relations and on trust between society and government, where these issues 
have been invoked in the discussion of the epidemic. We conclude with timelines for the 
early phases of the epidemic in the three countries. 
  
                                                     
1 First submitted April 27, 2020. Revised text submitted May 7, 2020. 
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Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic 
in Syria, Iran and Pakistan 
 
Maryam Ghadyani, Hinna Hussain, Wael Odeh, Philip Wood 
 
COVID-19 has had a sudden marked impact on economies and societies around the world. 
But these effects have not been the same in all countries, and it is, as yet, very unclear how 
cultural differences may be affecting responses to the epidemic, such as social distancing.  
The imposition of social distancing measures and voluntary or state-mandated isolation has 
prompted a massive re-orientation of public discussion on state and society, on religion and 
morality and on relationships between states. Pre-epidemic discourses have continued, of 
course. But they have increasingly been filtered through the new realities created by the 
virus. 
In this paper we offer a digital ethnography of the public response to COVID-19 in Syria, 
Pakistan and Iran. It investigates how the digital public discusses the pandemic. We have 
gathered data during the period of lockdown in March and the first half of April 2020 
through systematic observation of social media in Urdu, Arabic, Farsi and (where relevant) 
English, using platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube. These 
platforms are not discrete from one another: they frequently host content developed for 
other platforms through shared links, for example. Nevertheless, they each have a culture of 
their own and cater to a distinctive audience and demographics, and we have attempted to 
take these differences into account in our analysis. Our focus has been on how social media 
users made associations with the pandemic and with government responses to it. An 
appendix sets out timelines for government responses in each country and the reaction to 
this response, and a graph sets out rates of infection (which are currently much lower than 
many countries in Europe and North America).2 
We can make some generalisations about country-specific social media use. Persian-
speaking Twitter is dominated by members of the middle class and the diaspora and has a 
marked anti-regime slant, whereas Iranians tend to prefer Telegram and Instagram over 
Facebook because of high levels of regime scrutiny. (We found it hard to measure the 
popularity of posts within Telegram so we have not included data from this source in our 
sample. Other forms of social media were searched used the advanced search mechanisms 
provided by each platform). 
In Pakistan, Facebook is often used to share information as pictures and videos by people 
who would not compose posts themselves. Twitter in Pakistan tends to be a platform for 
activists and journalists (and those who follow their work), who are much more conscious of 
international trends and tend to compare Pakistan to other states. Instagram here tends to 
be focused on celebrity culture (and is currently a way for celebrities to share tips on 
quarantine lifestyles).  
                                                     
2 Our thanks to Zulfiqar Bhutta, Leif Stenberg, Sanaa Alimia and Mohamad Meqdad for their 
comments and further information. Unless otherwise indicated, websites in Arabic and Urdu were 
consulted on April 12, 2020 and websites in Persian and English were consulted on April 27, 2020. 
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In Syria, unlike Pakistan, it was noticeable that people tend not to share media sources such 
as e-news, which seems to reflect a distrust of government information and of media in 
general. On the other hand, the government is widely suspected of disseminating 
information informally (as rumour) and then monitoring public reactions on Facebook, 
which is easily the most significant form of social media in Syria now. The Syrian 
government is very actively involved in monitoring and manipulating communication on 
Facebook and YouTube and the creation of a permanent electronic footprint is a real concern 
for Syrians in particular.  
Finally, in all three countries there remains a digital divide that means that internet usage 
will greatly under-represent voices from rural areas, those who are illiterate in the national 
language or those beneath the poverty line (especially displaced people). We conceive of 
social media as a form of public space: images and texts circulate that generate a common 
emotional response and social media provides narratives into which users can imagine 
themselves. Nevertheless, we are aware that this is not the same thing as a common ideology 
and that social media is not a place that encourages reasoned dialogue, nor do we imagine 
that it is representative or all-encompassing. Some forms of social media are also likely to be 
much more conscious of international norms, and of international opinions regarding a 
domestic situation, than other forms of public discussion (including print media).3 
Data from shares and likes have made it possible to isolate the most influential 
commentators, but we also attempted to identify trends in the responses to these comments 
to see which statements were nuanced or contested by their readers. We have often included 
media pieces, but only where these were widely shared or commented on. In normal 
situations, one has to be careful to differentiate the kinds of opinions that are expressed 
online from those that are expressed in person. And there may be a tendency for the 
anonymity of some platforms (especially Twitter) to allow for more impulsive comments. But 
in the scenario of a pandemic lockdown, online activity is often a substitute for all forms of 
social activity and, in that sense, it becomes more representative of a given individual’s 
public interactions. Nevertheless, our method shares one weakness of much social media 
research in that we are unable to test how many users are exposed to content but do not 
react to it (‘observers’). 
Of course, social media is never sealed off from other forms of discussion. Even during 
lockdown, private discussions on WhatsApp and Snapchat are also important media for 
information exchange. These are private and ephemeral, and we can only access their 
contents through personal networks or through references or reactions on social media. It 
may be that WhatsApp tends to be used for material that users know will trigger negative 
reactions if shared more broadly: examples include dark humour, conspiracy theories or 
criticism of politicians that might generate repercussions. One anecdote from Pakistan 
suggests that social media users may be unwilling to criticise religious figures such as Tariq 
Jameel on Facebook for fear of reprisals and accusations of impiety, and that such criticism 
is displaced onto WhatsApp.4 
We have focused our attention on three Muslim-majority countries: Syria, Iran, Pakistan. 
Syria has responded to COVID-19 against a background of war, in which the Asad 
government has still not restored control over the whole of the country. There continues to 
be a large population of internally displaced refugees and medical infrastructure and 
                                                     
3 Cf. T. Peoll and J. Van Dyck, “Constructing Public Space: Global Perspectives on Social Media and 
Popular Contestation,” International Journal of Communication 10 (2016), 226-34. 
4 We thank Stephen Lyon for this point. 
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personnel have been badly affected by ten years of war (though, anecdotally, there is some 
testing available for those suspected of carrying the virus). Iran was the first country to have 
an outbreak of COVID-19 after China. Its initial response was largely reactive and included 
attempts to conceal the full extent of the outbreak from domestic and international 
audiences. But Iran’s ability to respond to the medical emergency has been hampered by 
American sanctions and its relative diplomatic isolation. Because the Iranian economy was 
already shrinking in 2019, senior figures like President Hasan Rouhani were extremely 
reluctant to pursue lockdown policies.5 Pakistan has a federal system and responses to 
COVID-19 have varied by province: the province of Sind has been especially proactive, while 
inhabitants of Baluchistan and Gilgit-Baltistan have accused central government of 
providing insufficient funds. Pakistan currently stands as an outlier in keeping places of 
worship open, a point we return to later. 
We begin by discussing how commentators have considered the theological significance of 
the pandemic, and the role of the clergy in fighting the virus, before considering trust 
between people and government and changes in the discussion of international relations. 
Religion and society 
If all of the countries we examine here are ‘Muslim’, however we define this, the place of 
religion in the discussion of the epidemic has been very different. The relationship between 
clerics and the state is very different. In Syria contemporary clerics cannot be overtly critical 
of government and there is a long tradition of governments selecting clerical appointments. 
Iran is an Islamic Republic, where clerics themselves monopolise many high offices, but it 
also has regular elections and changes in government and high ranking clerics often criticise 
one another and the government. In Pakistan, religious leaders can wield considerable 
political influence, and religious parties can bring major cities to a standstill. In Pakistan 
blasphemy laws are endorsed by the general public, and the danger that individuals will take 
the law into their own hands makes statements that might be construed as blasphemy very 
dangerous. This environment plays a major role in censoring the public discussion of 
religion. Nevertheless, there are vocal critics of religion, and of the influence of religion upon 
politics, in all three countries. 
The representation of extreme religion in Iran 
In Iran, the holy city of Qom was one of the first places to be struck by the epidemic. There 
was initially a debate over whether or not to close pilgrimage shrines in Mashhad and Qom 
which prompted two devotees to take widely circulated images of themselves licking the 
metal bars of the shrine as a sign of their devotion to the Imams6 Both men were later 
arrested amid much speculation that they were associated with, or inspired by the Shirazis, a 
Shia group that opposes the Islamic Republic.7 Soon afterwards, the government closed the 
shrines, which led to further protests in which the doors of the shrines were smashed.8 
                                                     
5 https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/covid-19-and-iranian-shadows-
war?utm_source=Chatham%20House&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=11425646_MENA%20C
OVID-19%20newsletter&dm_i=1S3M,6SW32,O7OFTI,R87RM,1 
6 https://nypost.com/2020/03/02/iranians-licking-religious-shrines-in-defiance-of-coronavirus-spread/  
7 https://twitter.com/aghPlt/status/1234467602069696514. For the Shirazis in general see 
https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2018/03/12/Who-are-the-Shirazis-opposing-Iran-s-
Guardianship-of-the-Islamic-Jurist- 
8 https://twitter.com/rezahn56/status/1239672237931868166 
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But if some commentators used the protests to attack the Shirazis, others used the events to 
attack religious fanaticism in general (which implicitly includes supporters of the regime): 
“The interesting thing is that a number of people are walking around, saying that this is not a 
real Shiite. These are British Shiites. No, my brother, you idiot, the purest Shiites in the 
country are these animals”.9 The commentator acknowledges that the government is trying 
to distinguish between the proper use of Shia guidance in politics and those of its critics, 
which it associates with foreign enemies. But he dismisses this claim: the excesses of 
religiosity shown in Qom are not only irrational but are actually the essence of Shi’ism. 
Another axis for the discussion of the religious significance of the pandemic was the 
contestation over ‘Islamic medicine’. Globally the epidemic has seen a resurgence of interest 
in alternative medicine, where figures in Europe, India and the US have promoted vitamin C, 
ginger or honey as cures for COVID-19. ‘Islamic medicine’ in Iran can be seen as an example 
of this broader trend, except that here, until quite recently, it was promoted by religious 
figures on state television. Herbal remedies were said to enjoy the support from the 
precedent of the Prophet and the Imams.10 But the epidemic saw a significant volte-face by 
the Islamic Republic in which supporters of Islamic medicine like Ayatollah Tabrizian were 
mocked.11 The fact that several mullahs were early victims of the virus also meant that there 
was widespread scepticism, especially after a medical doctor commented on the uselessness 
of ‘Islamic medicine’: “Mohsen Sharifi, a young man from Anzali, who was hospitalised in 
Anzali Hospital due to corona, and two days ago, one of Abbas Tabrizian's students went 
over his head in clerical clothes and rubbed Islamic medicine on his mouth!! He died an hour 
ago. Dr. Tahaei, the director of Anzali Hospital, said: ‘This cleric was introduced by Islamic 
propaganda.’"12 
Places of worship: The debate in Pakistan 
Across much of the world, including Muslim-majority countries, places of worship have been 
closed. Images of the empty Kaaba in Mecca have helped to disseminate the idea that these 
are exceptional times in which the hajj is suspended.13 In Pakistan, however, the government 
was indecisive over the issue of banning prayers in mosques and has ultimately chosen to 
keep mosques open. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Council of Islamic Ideology 
(CII) of Pakistan held consultations with clergy to discuss in confidence the possibility of 
offering prayers from home. This has had no legal impact. In practice mosques remain open 
for prayer.14 Some limited sanitation measures are in place and include: removing mosque 
carpets, holding Friday prayers in two  shifts, limiting numbers of people in prayers to 5, and 
disinfecting prayer halls (though how far these steps have been implemented is 
                                                     
9 https://twitter.com/paatesi/status/1239674507457150977 
10 Note the discussions of I. Perho, The Prophet’s Medicine: A Creation of the Muslim Traditionalist 
Scholars (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 1995) and G. Kharmi, “Al-tibb al-nabawi: The Prophet’s 
medicine”, in R. Tapper and K. McLachlan (eds), Technology, Tradition and Survival. Aspects of Material 
Culture in the Middle East and Central Asia (London/ Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2003). 
11 radiofarda. Also https://twitter.com/Mjr768/status/1232549235733733377 and 
https://twitter.com/deeas93/status/1231882599062294528 
12 https://twitter.com/AfshinHojjat/status/1242047224328093696 
13 In Iran, mosques have been re-opened from May 3, 2020 in so-called white zones where there has 
been a significant decline in the rate of infections. Major mosques in Aleppo and Damascus have 
allowed Ramadan prayers to take place from May 8, 2020. 
14 The province of Sindh introduced a curfew from April 3, 2020 from 12:00 to 15:00, which has, in 
practice, prevented people from attending Friday prayers. 
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questionable).15 The government has issued an edict (Section 144) to discourage public and 
religious gatherings or processions but this has not prevented prayer in mosques.16 In 
Ramadan the government and clerics agreed that the congregational and supplementary 
evening tarwih prayer should go ahead, albeit with social distancing and other precautionary 
measures encouraged within the mosques.17 A Gallup poll on April 22, 2020 indicated that in 
26% of Pakistani households at least one male member had attended Friday prayers.18 The 
discussion on social media has attempted to discourage people from attending mosques, 
which may illustrate that this discussion is out of step with the majority of the population. 
Pakistani social media has been broadly critical of this stance, and commentators have urged 
people to pray from home. This reflects the broadly left-liberal slant of Pakistani Twitter in 
particular. Some commentators have tended to present their ideas as a call for rationality or 
reasonable precautions over ‘religion’, which suggests that it is part of their public self-
fashioning as members of a (Westernised) educated middle class and/ or as ‘rational 
Muslims’. Many of the videos posted on social media show large crowds attending mosques 
in defiance of bans by local government or congregating to pray outside closed mosques.19 
Calls to piety 
Social media has tended to find religious responses to the epidemic in Pakistan and much of 
the Arab world. These posts include Quranic verses, dua (prayers), and opinions of religious 
scholars and local preachers about seeking strength from faith, calls for tawba (forgiveness 
from Allah) and religious charity, and reminders of the importance of religious practices, 
such as regular reading of the Qur’an. In Syria, shared material included inspirational 
comments by celebrities (such as the popular scholar Ratib Nablusi)20 or invitations to 
online versions of congregational prayers.21 Iran did not show this pattern, perhaps because 
public religious statements would seem to imply support for the regime, and people tend to 
use social media as an alternative to official media sources which are already saturated with 
religious ideas about the virus. 
Posts couched in religious language have sought to raise money for religious charities. 
Pakistan Day (March 23) was an occasion for people to show their commitment to the nation 
by pledging their time to fight the epidemic22 and the Pakistan Ulema Council urged 
                                                     
15 https://www.dawn.com/news/1543355, Dawn e-newspaper, Imtiaz Ali/ Sirajuddin/Umar 
Bacha/Tariq Naqash/Arif Hayat/ Javed Hussain, Mar 25, 2020, 74 comments 
16 https://dailytimes.com.pk/576713/coronavirus-section-144-imposed-in-pakistan-for-one-month/, 
Daily Times, Web Desk, March 15, 2020 
17 https://twitter.com/ArifAlvi/status/1251873073441255430. 
18 http://gallup.com.pk/declining-by-23-since-march-nearly-1-in-3-29-pakistanis-continue-to-report-
that-a-male-family-member-has-visited-the-mosque-for-friday-prayers/?fbclid=IwAR07_6hgi75-
OVGDXlNiS7Ye--rUCgti1RwQEl5-Avvt1HtccCWQaFd32UI 
19 https://twitter.com/qureshik74/status/1248567051851046912, Twitter account of Khurram Qureshi, 
April 10, 2020, 293 retweets, 892 likes, 29.1k views 
https://twitter.com/omar_quraishi/status/1242077539515928577, Twitter account of Omer R Quraishi, 
March 23, 2020, 305 retweets, 787 likes, 63.5k views 
20https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=217815412961762&id=110239713719333 
21https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=623306905188804&id=100025285003300 
22 https://twitter.com/ZaidZamanHamid/status/1249246659273424897 
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philanthropists and the wealthy to pay zakat prior to Ramadan to alleviate the financial 
crisis faced by daily-wage earners and the poor.23  
The Prime Minister, Imran Khan, described the battle against the epidemic as a jihad, in a 
statement widely shared and discussed on social media: “You do not need to panic. It is our 
belief that life and death are in the hands of Allah. We as a nation need to win this war 
against coronavirus”.24 Khan’s comments were made against the context of his establishment 
of a Corona Relief Tiger Force, which sought to mobilise young people, principally associated 
with his political party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI), to provide food and 
information.25 There has been some criticism of this force because of its links to PTI and 
opposition party spokespeople have expressed fears that it will become a means for misusing 
the Coronavirus Relief Fund. Imran Khan’s language of jihad fits into a wider anti-
Islamophobic use of the term jihad in non-military contexts, as a way of demonstrating the 
significance of religiously motivated struggle to social causes (the ‘greater jihad’). This also 
shows parallels to the rhetoric of many male world leaders where the pandemic has been 
described as a form of warfare and to older strands of discourse that reach for military 
language to generate national solidarity (e.g. Habib Bourgiba’s jihad for economic 
development or Lyndon Johnson’s ‘war on poverty’). 
Some figures in Pakistan have framed their discussion of the pandemic as the punishment of 
God. One recent example of this phenomenon is the statement of Mawlana Tariq Jameel, 
while sharing a platform with Imran Khan during a telethon on April 25, 2020. Jameel 
condemned the fact that Muslim women wore revealing clothing or danced and appeared to 
attribute the spread of the virus to immorality (he later apologised).26 The idea that religious 
leaders had blamed the virus on divine judgement had already been used to criticise religious 
leaders for facilitating the spread of COVID-19. In particular the Federal Science and 
Technology Minister, Fawad Chaudury, commented that people should not call ignorant 
men ‘scholars’, but reserve this term for people who spoke about matters on which they were 
actually knowledgeable.27  
In Syria some very early posts on the pandemic identified it as a divine punishment and 
called on people to “wear Hijab and fear our God instead of wearing a mask and fearing 
Coronavirus”28 or quoting a statement from an important hadith transmitter to attribute the 
virus to the spread of adultery29 or the Chinese persecution of the Uighurs.30 As the 
                                                     
23 https://www.dawn.com/news/1542491/ulema-urge-the-wealthy-to-pay-zakat-before-ramazan. The 
Pakistani government also assured clerics that zakat (obligatory tithes) would not be diverted from 
religious institutions towards ‘philanthropy’: https://www.dawn.com/news/1550419/govt-accepts-
most-demands-of-clerics 
24 https://nation.com.pk/18-Mar-2020/no-need-to-panic-says-prime-minister, The Nation e-newspaper, 
Maqbool Malik, March 18, 2020 
25 https://twitter.com/PakPMO/status/1244714908719202307, Twitter account of Prime Minister’s 
Office, Pakistan, March 31, 2020, 166 comments, 499 retweets, 1.8k likes 
26 https://dailytimes.com.pk/601968/maulana-tariq-jameels-comments-on-women-create-controversy. 
Also note https://www.dawn.com/news/1551400/kohat-clerics-elders-refuse-to-observe-sops-for-
ramazan. The latter report claims that the virus has not been spread in mosques and that it is “God’s 
wrath for wrongdoings”. Accessed April 25, 2020. 
27 https://twitter.com/fawadchaudhry/status/1243067407968677889 
28 https://www.facebook.com/bahaa.rajb.3/posts/488828885098714 
29https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=670937353677719&id=100022843815567 
30https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2944143139006761&id=2290751384345943 
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pandemic spread, others began to criticise those who circulated jokes about it, and called 
upon people to approach it seriously, as an expression of their Islamic morality.31 However, 
an overwhelming majority of posts from Syrians (both in the diaspora and inside the 
country) framed their discussion of the pandemic in anti-clerical terms, possibly in response 
to the descriptions of the pandemic as the wrath of God in earlier Syrian posts and in 
discussions in the rest of the Arab world. Unlike in Pakistan, the discourse about charity was 
often anti-clerical, and giving to hospitals was contrasted to giving to mosques, rather than 
classed as a similar kind of religiously motivated giving: “The virus will not respect your 
religion but your immune system. It will not fear your dua, it will fear your vaccination”32. 
Posters commented that the virus did not discriminate on the basis of religion and mocked 
religious leaders for their obsessive hatred of ‘infidels’.33 Others commented that religious 
extremism remained a more dangerous threat than COVID-19 (of course, similar sentiments 
are expressed for a wide variety of problems in Syria, ranging from the lack of fuel to the rate 
of unemployment).34  
Religion, therefore, plays a very different role in the online politics of our three case studies. 
In Pakistan there is a ‘rationalist’ critique of the role of the clergy in ascribing the disease to 
divine punishment, but this does not extend into criticism of religion per se or its role in 
society. In Syria, commentators seemed much more conscious of religion as a potential 
source of division within society, no doubt reflecting the sectarian dimension of recent 
conflict. In Iran positive commentary on religion would mark one as a regime sympathiser: 
here we may be seeing a reversal of the process seen in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, where 
the Catholic church’s opposition to the Soviet Union made it an attractive source of national 
identity. In Iran, criticism of the role of religion has tended to follow ‘safe’ paths of religious 
extremes that had already been condemned by elements within the state itself, such as 
Islamic medicine or the Shirazi movement. 
Trust and distrust in government 
Some commentators in all three of the countries sampled were critical of the states’ ability to 
handle the epidemic. It should be noted, of course, that this is true of all online 
commentators in all parts of the world: where there are no clear models for how a 
government ought to respond to a global epidemic public criticism is almost inevitable. In all 
of our cases, criticism of the government followed themes that were familiar before the 
epidemic. 
In Iran there is a long tradition of civil society criticising the state, though this is sometimes 
mollified when it is perceived that Iran is being subjected to unfair treatment from other 
states. Commentators were very sceptical of the statistics being produced by the government 
                                                     
31 https://www.facebook.com/sami.dabbit/posts/10216433435208845. This commentator is a Syrian 
doctor living in Dubai. 
32 
https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=%D8%A5%D8%BA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%20%D8%A
7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D9%8A&epa=FILTE
RS&filters=eyJycF9jcmVhdGlvbl90aW1lIjoie1wibmFtZVwiOlwiY3JlYXRpb25fdGltZVwiLFwiYXJnc1
wiOlwie1xcXCJzdGFydF9tb250aFxcXCI6XFxcIjIwMjAtMDNcXFwiLFxcXCJlbmRfbW9udGhcXFwiOl
xcXCIyMDIwLTAzXFxcIn1cIn0iLCJycF9sb2NhdGlvbiI6IntcIm5hbWVcIjpcImxvY2F0aW9uXCIsXCJh
cmdzXCI6XCIxMDYyNDIyNDI3NDg2MjNcIn0ifQ%3D%3D 
33 https://www.facebook.com/rateb.shabo/posts/3562327840504987 
34 https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=264526177860230&set=pb.100029085483183.-
2207520000..&type=3&theater 
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and accusations that the government had delayed the cancellation of flights from China. The 
arrest of prominent critics led to the suspicion that there was something to hide, especially 
from Twitter users who were already accustomed to attacking the regime.35 
In Pakistan there was an expectation of corruption in government-operated relief funds. Past 
crises were used to frame the response to the epidemic, especially where the federal 
government was seen to give false reassurances to the public or to be acting indecisively 
(though initial public praise for the government of Sindh was an important exception).36 
Political interference in the leadership of the healthcare system and inadequate medical 
provision were also points of criticism, especially when young doctors in Quetta, Baluchistan 
were arrested for protesting at the lack of PPEs.37 The absence of testing meant that the 
public was often sceptical of official infection figures, but most polling suggests that 
Pakistanis in general are confident in the government’s management of the crisis (60% in a 
Gallup poll conducted on March 25,  2020).38 
In Syria trust in the government was already very low after its involvement in war crimes 
against its own citizens. The journalist Nedal Maaloouf, now resident in Turkey, expressed 
his fears that weak states like Syria will be poorly equipped to face the virus and observed 
that prison and torture would not be an effective way of responding to the virus.39 
Commentators believed that the regime had already concealed the extent to which the virus 
had spread in Syria.40 (One parallel here is the Syrian government’s denial of the presence of 
HIV/ AIDS in Syria and other Arab states). Other commentators used dark humour to 
express their uncertainty over the situation: one early post was of an open grave, with the 
caption “precautionary measures from the department of health”.41 
During the military conflict, there was much public criticism of “traders of the conflict”, of 
profiteers who made money out of the war. The same vocabulary was used in two very widely 
shared videos that shamed political and religious authorities (both Muslim and Orthodox 
Christian) and challenged them to do the same and live up to their principles, while 
                                                     
35 https://twitter.com/HedayatBahare/status/1238088461904683008; 
https://twitter.com/peka1355/status/1237032486015774722; 
https://twitter.com/sabaazarpeik/status/1235545386540060673 
36 https://www.dawn.com/news/1542163, Dawn, Zofeen T. Ebrahim, March 30, 2020;  
https://www.dawn.com/news/1540230, Dawn e-newspaper, Ikram Junaidi, March 12, 2020; 
https://twitter.com/AamirInqlabi/status/1245431514193629186 
37 https://twitter.com/zarak_khaan/status/1247100489361211396, Zarak Khan official Twitter account, 
April 06, 2020, 451 retweets, 746 likes. Government reports on the May 4, 2020 now claim that PPE 
production in Pakistan meets requirements: 
https://twitter.com/zfrmrza/status/1257190717987917825/photo/1 
38 
https://www.facebook.com/GallupPak/photos/rpp.112923232073343/3041551835877120/?type=3&theat
er. Also 
https://www.facebook.com/GallupPak/photos/a.168760703156262/3079636168735353/?type=3&theater 
39 https://www.facebook.com/nedal.malouf/posts/10157267911074895 
40 Cf. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2020-03-18/doubts-surround-syrias-
claim-of-zero-coronavirus-cases, which was shared by Syrian commentators. 
41 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=927839027611793&set=a.321299454932423&type=3&theat
er  
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criticising the so-called “traders of the crises”. The success of these videos owed much to 
their ability to draw on a vocabulary that criticised hypocrisy that had been developed during 
the conflict of the past decade. 
Diaspora Syrians have also used the discussion of the epidemic as another means to criticise 
the government. They claimed that “the actual virus is the regime” and it is “much more 
dangerous for people than the coronavirus itself”.42 Its symptoms include “forced 
displacement, torture, detention” and “the death of a million Syrians”43. M. Katt shared a 
poster showing two photos to compare the number of people wearing masks to avoid the 
virus and the huge number of refugees escaping from the regime.44 These posts were 
prominent in the early discussion of the pandemic in Syria. 
The uncertainty in Syria seems particularly acute because of the absence of any government 
communication, in an authoritarian society that is very accustomed to the personality cult 
surrounding Bashar al-Asad. Among the very few high officials who publicly spoke about the 
problem was the Minister of Health, who answered a question from a journalist on what 
message he would send to citizens who are concerned and scared of the current problem. 
Building on earlier rhetoric in which the President compared the opposition to germs, the 
Minister stated that “the army of the Syrian Arab Republic has cleansed many of the germs 
on the soil of Syria… and I assure you that, up till this moment, we don’t have any 
coronavirus case in Syria”45 (March 13,  2020). People expected the President to appear on 
national TV and declare his government plans to protect people’s lives and its policy to 
support the affected economic sectors. To assure people, Damascus Now (دمشق اآلن) Facebook 
page tried on April 8, 2020 to explain the absence of the President from the scene: The page 
said that “the President, as a doctor, has since the beginning been searching for a cure for the 
virus before it spreads among his people, and he has reached important results. We will 
surprise the whole world soon”.46 Whether this page was really representing the point of 
view of the President or not, it was widely shared and filled with loyalist messages assuring 
the President of victory in his struggles. 
The requirements of social distancing amid a global economic downturn are and will be a 
strain on the trust between the state and society across the globe, including Europe and the 
United States. But even critics of their own state may realise that current governments are 
the only possible actors who can distribute resources and create new norms quickly in 
response to an epidemic. The scepticism seen in Iran and Syria expresses longstanding 
legitimacy deficits for these governments, but it is interesting that Imran Khan’s policies 
seem to have received a relatively positive reception. Pakistan is also an outlier in allowing 
mosques to remain open, and it remains to be seen whether the long-term cost of this policy 
may deepen the effects of the epidemic here. 
Religious identity and the treatment of minorities 
                                                     
42 https://www.facebook.com/songa.younga/posts/2717875288303161 
43 https://www.facebook.com/songa.younga/posts/2717875288303161 
44 https://www.facebook.com/mwafaq.katt/posts/2977195388999524 
45 https://www.facebook.com/all4syria.org/posts/1847008925433190 
46 
https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%20
%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF&epa=SEAR
CH_BOX 
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Discussion of how the epidemic has been concentrated in certain communities has provided 
an avenue for the ‘scientific’ expression of the distrust of internal communities and their 
lifestyles. In the context of the epidemic, lifestyle choices come to imply a danger for the 
whole of society by incubating the virus. But such criticisms also echo earlier criticism of 
minority groups. Thus criticism of the segregation of minorities or anxieties over minority 
birth rates may imply the dense clustering of settlement. Distrust of the hygiene, dietary or 
sexual practices of minority communities may be the presumed causes for the spread of 
disease. And the dominance of minority religious leaders whose rulings are trusted over 
those of the state may be seen as an underlying cause of the spread of disease in minority 
communities because social distancing measures are ignored. We find good examples of this 
suspicion of minority groups in the reporting of COVID-19 in Hasidic communities in Israel 
or Muslims in India.  
In Pakistan, discussion of the origins of COVID-19 has taken on a sectarian dimension. Some 
Sunnis have commented that it was spread by returning pilgrims from Iran via the Taftan 
border.47 A high profile criticism of the Special Assistant for Overseas Pakistanis, Zulfi 
Bukhari, by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz leader, Khawaja Asif, has given legitimacy to 
these criticisms. Others have identified a meeting of the Sunni missionary organisation 
Tablighi Jamaat at Raiwand Markaz as the source of the infection, where Palestinian and 
Kyrgyz Tablighis were tested positive for the virus after they returned home.48 In Syria, by 
contrast, discussion did not take on this sectarian tone, except perhaps when anti-
government commentators accused Iranians allied to the government of spreading the 
virus.49 
International relations 
For many states, foreign policy provided the initial lens through which COVID-19 was 
understood. For the countries in this sample, as for Anglophone Muslims, the first reaction 
to the news that COVID-19 had been identified in China was to blame the Chinese 
themselves or the Chinese state. For some, the Chinese had a particularly unhygienic 
lifestyle, and the foolishness of eating wild animals like bats, cats and dogs. This occasionally 
implied endorsement of Muslim dietary laws and the superior hygiene of Muslim societies. 50 
For others, the outbreak in Wuhan was the consequence of divine punishment for the 
Chinese mistreatment of the Uighurs and their authoritarian government. The latter tended 
to be the analysis used by clerics, especially those in Iran (where COVID-19 discourse was 
well-developed at an early stage because of the earlier outbreaks in Iran). 
                                                     
47 https://www.dawn.com/news/1543139  
48 https://www.facebook.com/pakistanPKaffairs/photos/basw.Abq and 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1547354 
49 https://ar.qantara.de/content/%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1-
%D9%83%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF-19-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%84-
%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%AD-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3-
%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7-
%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AB%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5%D8%A7-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%9F 
50 https://twitter.com/ghazeyekpa/status/1224085124494647296. One English-language example is 
https://twitter.com/Sahiba_e_Dil/status/1240277273317605377 
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However, several of the states in our sample have had good recent relations with the Chinese 
state. Pakistan has received large sums from China for the construction of a ‘Karakorum 
highway’ and the development of the port of Gwadar in Baluchistan. Here the narrative of 
China-Pakistan friendship soon replaced the initial criticisms of China. Pakistan sent aid to 
Wuhan and then received aid in turn after the first outbreaks, in the form of medical supplies 
and expert personnel.51 
Iran has been reliant on China for imports during a period of US sanctions.52 Early in the 
epidemic there was controversy over how business interests had lobbied to prevent the 
closure of the border to Chinese citizens.53 After China provided aid to Iran in medical 
supplies there was a slight shift in rhetoric, as some expressed gratitude,54 while others saw 
the interventions as a way for China to interfere in Iranian affairs, or mocked the help 
offered as being insufficient.55  
A public dispute involving the Chinese ambassador was also criticised in social media, where 
the Iranian health ministry accused the Chinese of producing false statistics. The 
ambassador replied, “Sir, I hope you respect the great facts and efforts of the Chinese 
people”, which many commentators found to be a breach of etiquette.56 This was a good 
example of an Iranian Twittersphere that is normally rather critical of the Iranian 
government rallying to attack non-Iranians who seem to disrespect Iran or fail to treat its 
officials with respect. The argument prompted criticism of China’s authoritarian policies, 
especially with regard to filtering Twitter;57 its polluting industries58 and its role in exporting 
the virus (which generated a famous spoof on the Chinese flag).59 Some of this criticism 
employed overtly racist language and imagery, referring to the Chinese as “almond eyes”.60 
However, discussion in Iran pivoted towards the United States after high-ranking clerics 
commented that American sanctions made it very difficult for Iran to respond effectively to 
the pandemic61 and even accused the US of deliberately spreading the virus among its 
enemies.62 Some commentators urged the lifting of sanctions to allow Iran to participate 
fully in a common global struggle.63 Nevertheless, Iranian Twitter has a particularly critical 
                                                     
51 https://images.dawn.com/news/1184847; https://tribune.com.pk/story/2185641/1-g-b-receives-
medical-aid-china-fight-spread-coronavirus/; https://tribune.com.pk/story/2163437/1-coronavirus-
will-not-impact-cpec-projects-yao/ 
52 https://www.irna.ir/news/83656926/شود-متوقف-امروز-از-چین-مستقیم-پروازهای 
53 https://twitter.com/amirmoghadam_ir/status/1223936058750128128; 
https://twitter.com/yasaman_2018/status/1224063740653514753; 
https://twitter.com/FourCzen/status/1223869092748238849 
54 https://twitter.com/rezaalavi56/status/1232269861507813377 
55 https://twitter.com/nikita11ad/status/1232322700225458176; 
https://twitter.com/h0d3r_fa/status/1232268279189778433 
56 Twitter link; RadioFarda. Comments at: 
https://twitter.com/alirezaroashan/status/1247127955572228097 and 
https://twitter.com/mhasanpour329/status/1247062462748385281 
57 https://twitter.com/amirmoghadam_ir/status/1247139183564595206 
58 https://twitter.com/AfsharMahnaz/status/1247174433388838912 
59 https://twitter.com/Majid06311897/status/1247086057776197635 
60 https://instahaha.com/p/B_KnwahHRjv.html 
61 https://twitter.com/MehdiMMJ/status/1243193879622549505 
62 economist 
63 https://twitter.com/Rouhani_ir/status/1241072247999287296 
 
 15 
15 
attitude towards the Islamic Republic and commentators accused the government of using 
crises like the pandemic to their own advantage: “One day war was a blessing to them. Then 
the boycott was a blessing to them. Now کرونا# It's been a blessing. With Corona they want to 
lift the embargo. The same boycott that was a blessing in itself. Corona is being deployed in 
Iran as leverage to lift sanctions. Everything that is a misery of the people is a blessing for the 
Islamic Republic.”64 
In contrast to our expectations, conspiracies about an American bio-weapon were not widely 
supported, though this was the official reason for refusing US aid. In particular, the high 
rates of pandemic infection in the US seemed to give the lie to the idea that the virus had 
been designed to target “the Iranian genome”.65 
The government of Pakistan itself intervened in this situation by asking the US to lift its 
sanctions, in response to a letter by President Hasan Rouhani. Imran Khan appealed to the 
international community to lift sanctions on humanitarian grounds.66 This met with some 
praise from commentators: Khan’s actions fit into a longer context of Pakistan presenting 
itself as a champion of the Muslim world (not least in its claim that its possession of nuclear 
weapon serves as a deterrent to enemies of other Muslim countries). Some Iranians felt that 
Pakistan was engaging in unnecessary interference: “ppl of #Iran are none of ur business. 
#KhameneiVirus rejected the help, #IslamicRepublicVirus has ruined Iran. U zip it & mind 
ur own business”.67  
In Syria, commentary on China focused on the effects of the lockdown on the Chinese 
economy and fears that lockdown would allow online American companies like Ebay and 
Amazon to take over the local market. The Chinese example was praised as early as the end 
of January because Chinese entrepreneurs like Jack Ma, owner of the Alibaba group, “bought 
all the stagnated goods with high prices …. Then he offered them on his Alibaba website with 
low prices making loss”: “this patriotic man” did not exploit the situation to make huge profit 
to himself.68 There is a sense here of the threat of local Syrian profiteers, but also a wider 
context of American cultural and economic globalisation, in which China is seen as an ally 
and role model. In a similar vein, Syrians’ observation of the pandemic in Europe and North 
America has led many to the conclusion that an authoritarian model has proved much more 
effective than the vacillation seen in more democratic countries. 
In general, the trend has been for initial criticisms of China to give way to admiration, 
whether commentators have seen China as a potential ally or as a good role model for 
efficient (i.e. non-democratic) government. One facet of this improved image may be the 
handling of the crisis by the United States, which was exacerbated in the case of Iran by the 
preservation of sanctions. To some extent, American sanctions have also caused critics of the 
Iranian government to mute their criticisms. Contemporary geopolitics have been much 
more important in guiding the discourse than any theoretical proximity between Christians 
and Muslims. 
                                                     
64 https://twitter.com/Alighazizade/status/1243617393383026691 
65 https://twitter.com/morkazemian/status/1243313716956991490 
66 https://nation.com.pk/20-Mar-2020/pakistan-calls-for-lifting-of-sanctions-on-iran 
67 https://twitter.com/ImranKhanPTI/status/1241697736703049729 
68 https://www.facebook.com/songa.younga/posts/2717875288303161; 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2446518142278189&set=a.1411189712477709&type=3&the
ater 
 
 16 
16 
Hopes for the future 
The historian of religion Jan Hjärpe commented that the shared experience of the second 
World War was a crucial source of definition for Europe.69 The experience of the war has 
been a defining feature of the way that narratives about the past were framed for all 
European states and for all European families (or rather for any family that self-fashioned as 
European). 
COVID-19 may turn out to be a common defining moment on a similar scale, in that it has 
the potential to establish political and economic patterns for a generation, as well as 
generating everyday experiences of lockdown and the displacement of social life onto the 
internet that will be broadly similar across different societies. There has been much 
speculation about how these trends may affect life after the virus is over, partly because 
commentators anticipate that this may establish longer-term trends. In Britain, for instance, 
commentators have speculated that the epidemic may generate a sense that society is only as 
strong as its weakest member and prompt a return to enthusiasm for the welfare state.  
In our sample, we found Iranians speculating that the epidemic will generate an anti-
religious backlash,70 as well as a repositioning of the global order of states.71 Both are issues 
that were already close to the forefront of the Iranian popular imagination, especially 
because it has suffered as a result of its treatment by the US, which is currently the only 
globally hegemonic power. Syrians are likely to be exhausted from speculating about the 
future on the basis of a rapidly changing present and the abstract nature of hopes for the 
future may reflect the impossibility of safely suggesting any concrete alternatives to the 
current political situation. One Syrian comment that was widely shared expressed the hope 
that the new heroes of Syria would be “doctors, nurses and people working in public service” 
rather than “footballers, singers or reality tv stars”.72 Finally, in Pakistan we found that 
commentators were disinterested in this kind of long-term speculation: here the media 
narrative has tended to be parochial, and has rarely speculated on how the country might 
change after lockdown beyond a limited discussion on Pakistan’s future economic 
challenges. 
Social media certainly offers the potential for the emergence of new forms of politics and 
new avenues to power for traditional politicians. For instance, Tobias Matthiesen’s study of 
Shia politics in eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain argues that sectarian agitation is an 
effective shortcut to promotion for ambitious clerics.73 We hypothesise that, as use of social 
media becomes more widespread, the potential exists for groups to cohere around minority 
positions of all kinds, both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’, however these are defined. One liberal 
example from Syria is the cleric Mohammad Habash, who criticised clerics who thought that 
religion could provide the answer to the pandemic: “Confronting the epidemic and searching 
                                                     
69 J. Hjärpe, “What will be chosen from the Islamic basket?”, European Review 5 (1997), 267-74. 
70 https://www.instagram.com/p/B_IVicHpTw8/?igshid=17i6rzu5sczt5 
71 https://twitter.com/vahabzadeh_ali/status/1244239358087122946 
72 https://www.facebook.com/firas.tlass.9/posts/304276153885232. However, note that Tlass is a 
controversial figure. A member of the Syrian Opposition, he was the son of a Defence Minister under 
Hafiz al-Asad, but he is a popular figure in the Syrian Opposition and amongst religious minorities 
and repeatedly criticised his father’s ‘mistakes’, both explicitly and implicitly. 
73 T. Mathiesen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring that wasn’t (Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2013) 
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for a drug is the task of science alone ...As for the cleric, his task is to confront hatred…, and 
to spread faith and love”.74 
If one effect of the pandemic is to encourage use of social media and to increase digital 
literacy on these platforms, then 2020 may prove to be a turning point, when the social 
effects of the transition of political discourse into online spaces accelerates. Especially for 
younger people who were already ‘digital natives’, the experience of lockdown may increase 
the importance of social media as the space for display where reputations are formed. In all 
linguistic and cultural domains this transition is likely to involve a breakdown of a unified 
public sphere into different silos. Of course, such a transition is also dependent on the 
continued expansion of online access, and therefore on the wider economic climate.
                                                     
74 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=10216466774285932&id=1354218088 
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Timeline of COVID-19 in Pakistan 
i) January 2020 
 Jan 19, 2020: The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, stressed 
the importance of the international community’s continued attention to the suffering 
of Kashmiris and demanded the issue be resolved in line with the UN resolutions and 
the will of the Kashmiri people.1 
 January 26, 2020: The Foreign Office of Pakistan rejected the possibility of 
coronavirus among any Pakistani students in Wuhan, China.2  
 January 27, 2020: Authorities in Gilgit Baltistan (GB) stopped two shipping 
containers carrying goods from entering Pakistan through Khunjerab Pass and 
requested the federal government to delay re-opening of the China-Pakistan border 
amid the COVID-19 scare. 
 January 29, 2020:  Coronavirus was confirmed in four Pakistani students studying 
in China.3 
 January and February 2020: Social media blamed the dietary practices of 
Chinese people as the main cause of COVID-19. 
ii) February 2020 
 February 02, 2020: The Pakistani government sent medical aid to Wuhan, which 
was the epicentre of COVID-19 at that time.4   
 February 02, 2020: Amid COVID-19 scares, 10 Pakistani students arrived in 
Lahore from China via Bangkok after flight cancellations and the government’s 
refusal to bring them back immediately.5  
 February 02, 2020: The State Minister of Health, Zafar Mirza, informed the public 
that Pakistan had received its first COVID-19 diagnosing materials6and that health 
information booths had been set up at the airports as initial precautionary measures.7 
                                                     
1 https://twitter.com/SMQureshiPTI/status/1218920930212286465, Twitter account of Shah Mahmood 
Qureshi, Jan 19, 2020, 349 retweets, 1.5K likes  
2 https://www.dawn.com/news/1530684, Dawn e-newspaper, Naveed Siddiqui, January 26, 2020  
3 https://www.dawn.com/news/1531241, Dawn e-newspaper, January 29, 2020 
4 https://nation.com.pk/02-Feb-2020/coronavirus-supplies-for-china-arrive, The Nation, web desk, 
February 02, 2020 
5 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/608148-10-pak-students-reach-lahore-from-china-via-bangkok, 
February 03, 2020 
6 https://twitter.com/zfrmrza/status/1223895185156911104, Twitter account of Zafar Mirza, February 
02, 2020, 1k retweets, 5.5.k likes 
7 https://twitter.com/zfrmrza/status/1223930637649883138, Twitter account of Zafar Mirza, February 
02, 2020, 73 retweets, 271 likes 
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 February 22, 2020: Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Jam Kamal Khan, declared a 
health emergency in districts of the province bordering Iran when five deaths were 
confirmed there.8 
 February 23, 2020: Pakistan temporarily closed its border with Iran and decided 
not to allow anyone to cross into Pakistan without screening at Taftan and four other 
entry points in Baluchistan.9 
 February 25, 2020: Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing, speaking at the 
inaugural ceremony of Energy Week, said that the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) would not be affected by the COVID-19 crisis.10  
 February 26: State Minister of Health, Zafar Mirza, confirmed the first two cases of 
coronavirus in Pakistan and suggested citizens avoid panic as the situation is under 
control.11  
iii) March 2020 
 March 01, 2020: The Sindh government decided to close all educational 
institutions in the province until March 13, 2020, due to the COVID-19 threat.12   
 March 02, 2020: Pakistan closed its Chaman border with Afghanistan from March 
02, 2020, over coronavirus fears while other crossing points at Torkham, Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) remained open.13 
 March 03, 2020: In Gilgit Baltistan (G-B), the first COVD-19 case was confirmed in 
a woman who returned from Iran a few days before.14 
 On March 04, 2020: Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Health, Zafar 
Mirza, dismissed the view that the government is hiding confirmed COVID-19 cases 
by stating “Every little case of the common cough or flu should not be mistaken for 
the coronavirus”.15  
                                                     
8 https://nation.com.pk/23-Feb-2020/balochistan-declares-coronavirus-health-emergency-along-
border-with-iran, The Nation, News Desk, February 23, 2020 
9 https://www.dawn.com/news/1536327, Dawn e-newspaper, Saleem Shahid, February 24, 2020 
10 https://tribune.com.pk/story/2163437/1-coronavirus-will-not-impact-cpec-projects-yao/, The Express 
Tribune, Correspondent, February 26, 2020 
11https://twitter.com/zfrmrza/status/1232707169163841537?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etwee
tembed%7Ctwterm%5E1232707169163841537&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.24newshd.tv%2F26-
Feb-2020%2Fdr-zafar-mirza-confirms-two-coronavirus-cases-in-pakistan, Twitter account of Zafar 
Mirza, February 26, 2020, 529 comments, 2.8k retweets, 8.2k likes   
12 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/622608-coronavirus-threat-in-sindh-educational-institutions-to-
remain-closed-till-13th, The News, News Report,  March 02, 2020 
13 https://tribune.com.pk/story/2167234/1-pakistan-close-chaman-border-afghanistan-amid-covid-19-
outbreak/, The Express Tribune, Mohammad Zafar, March 1, 2020 
14 https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/627631-gilgit-baltistan-reports-second-case-pakistan-tally-rises-
to-20, The News, Web Desk, March 11, 2020 
15 https://dailytimes.com.pk/570314/govt-not-hiding-coronavirus-cases-in-pakistan-due-to-psl/, Daily 
Times, March 05, 2020 
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 March 04, 2020: The federal government expelled Health Secretary, Dr. Allah 
Bakhsh Malik, and appointed Dr. Syed Tauqir Hussain Shah as the additional 
secretary in-charge.16 
 March 05, 2020: Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Jam Kamal Khan Alyani, informed 
that the government had made all necessary arrangements to deal with the 
coronavirus. A minimum of 1,800 pilgrims were treated and screened at the 
quarantine centres at the Taftan border.17 
 March 08, 2020: Despite criticism from conservative segments of the country, the 
annual Aurat March was held in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Sukkur and Quetta to 
celebrate International Women’s Day.18 
 March 09, 2020: Nine people who returned to Karachi from abroad were tested 
coronavirus positive and pushed the total count to 13  cases in Sindh and 16 in 
Pakistan overall.19  
 March 09, 2020: The US$ climbed to PKR 3.65 in the interbank after six months. 
Exchange Companies of Pakistan former general secretary, Zafar Paracha, said, “for 
the past few days, foreigners have been unloading their positions in the stock market 
[$16.7 million last week] and repatriating back the dollars, which has put pressure on 
the interbank rate.”20 
 March 10, 2020: Approximately 70,000 to 80,000 members of Tablighi Jamaat 
attended the religious congregation held at Raiwind Markaz, Punjab. This included 
people from 40 different countries.21  
 March 11, 2020: Dr. Syed Tauqir Hussain Shah was removed from his position as 
the additional secretary in-charge,  though he had been appointed to this position 
only a week earlier.22 
 March 13, 2020: The Federal Minister of Education, Shafqat Mahmood, 
announced the closure of private and public educational institutions in the country 
until April 05, 2020, although everything else in the country was open.23 
                                                     
16 https://www.dawn.com/news/1540230, DAWN e-newspaper, Ikram Junaidi, March 12, 2020 
17 https://tribune.com.pk/story/2170286/1-1800-pilgrims-screened-taftan-border-cm/, The Express 
Tribune, Mohammad Zafar, March 06, 2020 
18 https://twitter.com/umar8528/status/1247490333933535232, Twitter account of Umar, 109 retweets, 
227 likes 
19 https://tribune.com.pk/story/2172615/1-5th-coronavirus-case-emerges-karachi-tally-soars-8-
pakistan/, The Express Tribune, Sameer Mandhro, March 09, 2020 
20 https://www.dawn.com/news/1539719, Dawn e-newspaper, Mutaher Khan, March 10, 2020 
21 https://www.dawn.com/news/1547354, Dawn e-newspaper, Asif Chaudhry, April 08, 2020  
22 https://www.dawn.com/news/1540230, Dawn e-newspaper, Ikram Junaidi, March 12, 2020 
23 https://twitter.com/Shafqat_Mahmood/status/1238464735538003968, Twitter account of Shafqat 
Mahmood, March 13, 2020, 2.2k retweets, 8.4k likes  
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 March 14, 2020: The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) announced the suspension of 
flights from different airports across the country from March 16, 2020, to March 31, 
2020, amid rising COVID-19 cases.24 
 March 15, 2020: Section 14425 was imposed across the country for a month 
discouraging congregations (including Tablighis), processions, and public and 
religious gatherings.26 
 March 16, 2020:  Senator Murtaza Wahab informed that the total number of 
COVID-19 cases in Sindh reached 146. One hundred and nineteen of 146 cases were 
Zaireen (Pakistani Shia pilgrims who had been visiting Iran) who were kept in 
Sukkur, Karachi, and Hyderabad.27 
 March 17, 2020: Pakistan Super League (PSL) matches were postponed after a 
foreign player in the team was tested COVID-19 positive.28  
 March 17, 2020: PM Imran Khan addressed the nation and advised the masses to 
seek strength from their faith while equating the fight against corona with jihad (holy 
struggle). He said, “You do not need to panic. It is our belief that life and death are in 
the hands of Allah. We as a nation need to win this war against coronavirus.” In his 
address, he ruled out the possibility of locking down cities to fight the pandemic.29 
 March 17, 2020: The Pakistan Ulema Council (PUC) issued a fatwa to postpone all 
political and religious congregations "immediately" due to coronavirus. The Council 
announced that it would discontinue Urdu sermons and shorten Arabic sermons 
during Friday congregations. It also advised to keep a safe distance between rows of 
worshippers and to offer prayers on floors washed with soap and water instead of 
prayer mats. The elderly and the sick were advised to pray at home.30 
 March 20, 2020:  PM Imran Khan gave instructions to open the Chaman-
Spinboldak border and let trucks cross into Afghanistan.31 
 March 20, 2020: Following the letter written by the President of Iran, Hassan 
Rouhani, requesting Pakistan to play a role in the lifting of American sanctions on 
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Iran amid COVID-19, PM Imran Khan urged the international community to lift 
sanctions against Iran on humanitarian grounds.32   
 March 20, 2020: The Government of Pakistan asked the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to consider giving “a low-cost, fast-disbursing loan under the fund’s 
Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) to deal with the adverse economic impact of 
COVID-19”.33 
 March 22, 2020: Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi urged his German 
counterpart Heiko Maas to provide relief on loan payments to countries like Pakistan 
which are under external debt so they can focus their efforts on overcoming the 
pandemic.34  
  March 22, 2020: Gilgit-Baltistan imposed a two-week lockdown with exemptions 
for groceries and pharmacies.35 
 March 23, 2020 (Pakistan Day): People showed their commitment to continuing 
their fight against coronavirus.36 
 March 23, 2020: The Sindh government issued a directive to lock down and close 
everything except essential services.37  
 From March 23, 2020: The Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir (AJK), Raja Farooq 
Haider, announced a three-week lockdown in AJK.38  
 March 24, 2020: The Punjab government announced partial lockdown in the 
province with exemptions for grocery stores and pharmacies.39 
 March 24, 2020: The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) government announced partial 
closure from March 22, 2020, to March 24, 2020, with an exception for pharmacies, 
groceries, petrol stations and auto workshops.40 
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 March 24, 2020: Baluchistan deployed the army and imposed lockdown with 
exceptions for medical stores and basic groceries from March 24, 2020, to April 07, 
2020.41 
 March 24, 2020: The government of Pakistan granted permission to Fly Dubai and 
Qatar Airways to operate special flights to bring back stranded passengers at Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai airports to Islamabad Airport.42 
 March 24, 2020: People in diverse parts of Pakistan heard the azaan (call to 
prayers) at an unusual time after 10:00 pm. People used hashtag '#Azaan' to share 
this experience.43  
 March 26, 2020: Federal Minister for Science and Technology, Fawad Chaudhry, 
attributed the reason that COVID-19 had spread in the country to the ignorance of 
the conservative religious class that considers coronavirus as a punishment from 
God.44   
 March 26, 2020: The Governments of Sindh and Baluchistan announced that 
people will not be allowed to offer congregational prayers on Friday. “The decision 
came only hours after the federal government said that mosques would remain open 
and congregational prayers would be offered in limited numbers”.45 
 March 27, 2020: Gilgit-Baltistan received large amounts of medical supplies 
donated by China to cope with the coronavirus crisis in the region. The donation 
included “two tons of masks, test kits, ventilators, medical protective clothes worth 
67 million rupees”.46 
 March 28, 2020: “A special aircraft from China brought relief assistance to Pakistan 
including 12,000 test kits, 300,000 masks, and 10,000 protective suits. In addition 
to this, eight members of a medical expert team also arrived in Pakistan from China. 
Moreover, the Chinese government also provided $4 million of support for a separate 
hospital for Coronavirus patients.”47 
 March 28, 2020: Since COVID-19 was first reported in Pakistan, cases in Punjab 
rose to 448 which surpassed Sindh which had 425 cases.48    
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 March 28, 2020: The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, wished HRH Prince 
Charles and UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, a speedy recovery and good health. 
He emphasised the need for an internationally coordinated response to counter 
COVID-19.49 
 March 29, 2020:  Sindh Chief Minister, Murad Ali Shah, approved a suggestion to 
release 4,000 convicts from prisons in Sindh for three months to prevent the spread 
of coronavirus. This verdict did not apply to prisoners convicted of drug and 
terrorism charges.50  
 March 31, 2020: The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, invited the overseas 
Pakistani community to participate in the Corona Relief Fund and to help Pakistan 
come out of the crisis.51  
 March 31, 2020: The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
marked “Pakistan among the countries which would be the hardest-hit by the global 
pandemic of coronavirus” and demanded that prompt relief measures be taken. 
 March 31, 2020: The federal cabinet approved a PKR1.2-trillion Corona Relief 
Package. The Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) also approved a special relief 
package of cash aid for 12 million poor families under the ‘Ehsaas Programme’.52  
 March 31, 2020: The Prime Minister’s Office announced the establishment of the 
‘Corona Relief Tiger Force’ comprising youth who would join the Government’s and 
the army’s efforts to provide aid, food, and awareness to the masses.53. 
iv) April 2020 
 April 01, 2020: The Minister for Planning and Development, Asad Umar, 
announced that lockdown conditions in the country would continue for two more 
weeks until April 14, 2020.54 
 April 02, 2020: Prime Minister Imran Khan condemned the new domicile law 
introduced by the Indian government in occupied Kashmir which allows an Indian 
citizen who has resided in occupied Jammu and Kashmir for 15 years to call the 
territory his or her place of domicile.55  
                                                     
49 https://twitter.com/ImranKhanPTI/status/1243924181932216321, Twitter account of Imran Khan, 
March 28, 2020, 7.4k likes , 41.3k likes  
50 https://www.dawn.com/news/1544810, Dawn e-newspaper, Imtiaz Ali, March 30, 2020 
51 https://twitter.com/PakPMO/status/1244715590880821249, official Twitter account of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, Pakistan, March 31, 2020, 183 retweets, 582 likes  
52 https://www.geo.tv/latest/280078-federal-cabinet-meets-to-approve-coronavirus-relief-package 
53 https://twitter.com/PakPMO/status/1244714908719202307, official Twitter account of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, Pakistan, March 31, 2020, 166 comments, 499 retweets, 1.8k likes  
54 https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/638213-govt-extends-lockdown-to-april-14-to-fight-coronavirus, 
The News, April 02, 2020  
55 
https://www.facebook.com/dawndotcom/photos/a.250924510441/10163436300320442/?type=3&theater
3.2K likes, 850 comments, 261 shares 
 
 25 
25 
 April 05, 2020: A case was registered against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) cleric 
Maulana Abdul Aziz and seven others for “provoking people against the state, playing 
jihadi anthems and organising congregational prayer despite the ban”. This was done 
when congregational Friday prayers were banned by the district government.56  
 April 06, 2020: Nine people were killed in occupied Kashmir as authorities 
enforced a lockdown to fight the spread of the coronavirus.57 Jammu-Kashmir had 
already been under curfew after India revoked its special status as a semi-
autonomous state on August 05, 2019. 
  April 06, 2020: Chief Justice of Pakistan, Gulzar Ahmed, expressed discontent 
over the federal government’s failure to overcome the pandemic.58  
 April 06, 2020: Baluchistan Police arrested more than 12 young doctors in Quetta 
for protesting over the unavailability of PPE in provincial hospitals during the spread 
of COVID-19.59 
 April 06-09, 2020: The border crossing points at Chaman and Torkham were re-
opened at the special request of the Afghan government. This permission was granted 
only for Afghan citizens, not for Pakistani citizens.60 
 April 09, 2020:  The Government of Pakistan “pledged US$ 3 million” towards the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) COVID-19 Emergency 
Fund for regional support against coronavirus.61 
 April 09, 2020: The News reported that the IMF planned to provide a US$1.4 
billion loan to Pakistan by the following week. Additionally, “the World Bank (WB) 
has approved a $1 billion loan and the Asian Development Bank has approved $1.5 
billion in aid for Pakistan”.62 
 April 13, 2020: Over 53 senior clerics of the Wafaqul Madaris al-Arabia of 
Rawalpindi and Islamabad, warned the government not to extend the restrictions 
imposed on mosque congregations to control the coronavirus. This warning was 
issued before the government’s plan to control the pandemic in the month of 
Ramadan.63  
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 April 14, 2020: Prime Minister Imran Khan announced an extension of lockdown 
in the country for another two weeks with exceptions for certain industries like 
construction.64   
 April 15, 2020: Of a total of 2,945 COVID-19 cases confirmed in Punjab, 1,055 were 
members of Tablighi Jamaat.65 
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Timeline of COVID-19 in Syria 
i) December 2019  
 Very few comments and updates about the situation in China. 
ii) January 2020 
 January 25, 2020: Towards the end of January an increasing number of Syrians 
expressed their concerns about the possibility of the virus reaching Syria. The official 
authorities still looked at it as an external threat. The ministry of health announces 
on its Facebook page that it is “applying strict health measures to prevent the virus by 
monitoring all border crossings”.66 January 25 and 26, 2020: Rumours circulated 
about cases in Syria including areas controlled by the opposition. Many Arabic and 
Syrian news websites, as well as social media pages circulated news about the virus 
reaching Syria.  
 January 26, 2020: Both the regime and the opposition denied the presence of 
COVID-19. According to the Nedaa Syria website,67 the Minister of Health, Nizar 
Yazjee, confirmed on the ministry’s Facebook page that “no cases of the virus have 
been recorded in Syria so far”. He also assured that the ministry was “taking all 
necessary measures to prevent the virus from spreading in Syria… through 
monitoring all of the border crossings and the airport and checking the suspected 
cases especially those who are coming from the badly affected countries”.68 The Enab 
Baladi website (opposition) quoted medical sources in the hospital that the two girls 
died after suffering from rapid respiratory failure, which was not due to coronavirus, 
according to Dr Muhammad al-Saleh, the Coordinator of the Early Warning and 
Response Network for outbreaks in northern Syria.69 
iii) February 2020 
 February 06, 2020: The government announces a national plan to prevent the 
virus from entering Syria. This includes general medical preparation.70 
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 February 21, 2020: As Lebanon confirms its first case,71 the Syrian Ministry of 
Health assures Syrians that Syria is coronavirus free.72  
iv) March 2020 
 March 01, 2020: The Syrian government announces precautionary measures 
including the temporary suspension of tourists coming from affected counties.73 
 March 13, 2020: The Syrian government decides to suspend schools and 
universities, and reduces working hours as part of preventative measures to limit the 
spread of coronavirus in the country. The Syrian Arab News Agency said “Because of 
the increasing threat of the coronavirus worldwide as it has become a global 
epidemic, the Syrian government has taken a number of preventative steps to protect 
citizens".74 
 March 21, 2020: Measures include:  
 churches suspend services and public prayers until further notice.75 
 suspension of Friday prayers in mosques.76 
 shops close except for food stores and pharmacies.77 
 dedicating sections of many hospitals to coronavirus cases (quarantine).78  
 March 22, 2020: The first case is confirmed. Syria announces the first person 
“coming from abroad” who tested positive of coronavirus.79 The news is shared by the 
Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) on Twitter.80 Commentators expressed worries 
that Syria will go through similar scenarios as other countries. Some argued that the 
infection came from Iran in reference to the close relations between the regime and 
Iran. Other measures included: 
 suspension of public transport inside cities and between governorates.81 
 suspension of printed newspapers.82 
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 Syria closes the borders with Lebanon.83  
 March 29, 2020: The Syrian Ministry of Health announces the first death caused 
by COVID-19.84  
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Timeline of COVID-19 in Iran 
i) January 2020 
 January 30, 2020: Iran quarantines two Chinese women in Iran suspected of 
carrying coronavirus (later released).85 
 January 31, 2020: Iran’s Health Minister urges banning the entry of travellers 
from China.86 The World Health Organisation declares coronavirus emergency 
situation. 
ii) February 2020 
 February 02, 2020: Increasing criticism of the failure to stop flights from China to 
Iran.87 
 February 11, 2020: The Anniversary of the Islamic Revolution of Iran 
 February 12, 2020: Iran’s Health Minister says there are no positive cases of 
COVID-19 up to now.88 
 February 19, 2020: Two deaths from COVID-19 in Qom.89 
 February 20, 2020: Closing of schools and universities in Qom.90 Ongoing flights 
from China to Iran.91 
 February 21, 2020: Iranian legislative election. 
 February 22, 2020: Closure of schools, universities, theatres and cinemas in Iran. 
 February 23, 2020: Neighbouring countries close their borders with Iran.92 Iran’s 
Leader says enemies tried to use coronavirus 
to affect votes.93 
 February 24, 2020: Iran’s Deputy Health Minister: “I am not supporting 
quarantining Qom. It is a pre-World War I method”.94 
 February 25, 2020: The Governor of Qom: “We have no plans to quarantine Qom 
or to close holy shrines and mosques in Qom”.95 
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 February 26, 2020: President Rouhani: “Coronavirus situation to return to 
normal. Fomenting fear about coronavirus is a plot by the enemies who are 
attempting to halt the Islamic Republic’s activities”.96 The Chinese Ambassador to 
Iran states that China has sent humanitarian aid (test kits) to Iran.97 Arrest of 24 
people for generating rumours about COVID-19 in Iran.98 
 February 27, 2020: Ban on the entry of Chinese citizens to Iran.99 Cancellation of 
Friday prayers in Tehran and other cities in Iran.100  
 February 28, 2020: Closure of the Iranian Parliament.101 
iii) March 2020 
 March 03, 2020: Iran temporarily frees 54,000 prisoners to combat the spread of 
coronavirus.102 
 March 13, 2020: Khamenei calls coronavirus a “possible biological attack” and asks 
guards to contain it.103 
 March 14, 2020: The President of Iran states that U.S. sanctions “severely hamper” 
Iran’s fight against COVID-19.104 
 March 16, 2020: Closing of Iran’s holiest sites to visitors.105 Protests and breaking 
of the gate of the holy shrine of Masoumeh in Qom to enter in protest against its 
closure.106 
 March 20, 2020: Nowrouz (the Iranian new year and the start of holidays and 
travels). The President of Iran writes a letter to the U.S. blaming its sanctions for 
coronavirus deaths in Iran.107  
 March 22, 2020: Closure of all commercial centres in Tehran except pharmacies 
and supermarkets.108 The Iranian leadership refuses U.S. help to fight COVID-19, 
citing conspiracy theory.109 
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 March 24, 2020: Iran rejects offer of help by Doctors Without Borders (MSF) to 
fight coronavirus.110 
iv) April 2020  
 April 06, 2020: An Iranian Health Ministry official’s criticism of China's 
coronavirus figures causes uproar.111  
 
Graph showing the spread of COVID-19 infection vs. time in Iran, Pakistan and 
Syria112 
 
. 
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111 RadioFreeEurop 
112 Our thanks to Zulfiqar Bhutta (Aga Khan University, Centre of Excellence in Women and Child 
Health) for this graph. 
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